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Bad News for Mail Robbers: 




 The Supreme Court may be teeing up for its most dramatic 
intervention in American politics, and most flagrant abuse of 
its power, since Bush v. Gore.  Challenges to President Obama’s 
health care bill have started to work their way toward the 
Court, and have been sustained by two Republican-appointed 
district judges.   
The constitutional objections are silly.  But because 
constitutional law is abstract and technical, and almost no one 
reads Supreme Court opinions, the conservative majority on the 
Court may feel emboldened to adopt these silly objections in 
order to crush the most important progressive legislation in 
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decades.  One lesson of Bush v. Gore, which, surveys showed, did 
no harm at all to the Court’s prestige in the eyes of the 
public,1 is that if there are any limits to the judges’s power, 
those limits are political:  absent a likelihood of public 
outrage, they can do anything they want.  So the fate of health 
care reform may depend on the constitutional issues being at 
least well enough understood for shame to have some effect on 
the Court. 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
includes a so-called “individual mandate,” actually a tax that 
must be paid by individuals who go without health insurance.2  
This mandate is the focus of challenges to the law.  Without the 
mandate, the law’s protection of people with preexisting 
conditions would mean that healthy people could wait until they 
get sick to buy insurance.  That would bankrupt the entire 
health insurance system, because no one would be paying into the 
pools.  Congress decided to charge those people for the costs 
they impose on their fellow citizens. 
Two federal district judges have declared this provision 
unconstitutional.  Their reasoning is bizarre and mischievous.  
The novel approach to constitutional law that they propose would 
                     
1 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and 
Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 Judicature 32 (2001).  
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). The individual mandate is § 1501(b) (to 
be codified at 26 U.S.C § 5000A). 
3 
 
misread the Constitution, betray the intentions of the framers, 
and cripple the nation’s ability to address one of its most 
pressing problems. 
The correct legal analysis is simple.  Congress has the 
authority to solve problems that the states cannot separately 
solve.  It can choose any reasonable means to do that. 
 
I. The obvious constitutionality 
 
 The “mandate” is clearly within Congress’s power under 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution to “regulate Commerce . 
. . among the several states.”  Under settled present law, some 
of it nearly 200 years old, Congress may regulate activity that 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  It may 
regulate local, noneconomic behavior, the Supreme Court recently 
held, when such regulation is “an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”3  It thus as recently as 2005 upheld a federal ban on 
growing marijuana for personal consumption. 
The problem of insuring those with preexisting conditions 
could be addressed with a single-payer insurance system, of the 
kind that exists in Canada, France, and England:  everyone gets 
                     
3 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-24 (2005)(quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
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insurance provided by the government, funded by general 
taxation.  The American government already forces you to buy 
single-payer insurance against poverty in your old age.  That’s 
Social Security.  A similar single-payer system of medical care 
makes a great deal of sense, but so many powerful interests were 
arrayed against it that it was never going to pass.  Political 
obstacles aside, Congress is entitled to decide that a 
government monopoly of health provision would be inefficient, 
and that insurance is best provided by the private sector.  In 
that case, the only way to guarantee health insurance for 
everyone is to require the healthy to purchase private 
insurance.  The remedy tightly fits the problem. 
The power to regulate insurance markets is part of the 
commerce power.  The Supreme Court declared in 1944:  “Perhaps 
no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons 
in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance 
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business 
of almost every person in the United States.”4  
Congress has the discretion to decide the best way to 
accomplish that.  The list of Congressional powers in Article I 
ends with an authorization to “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper” to carry out its responsibilities.  The 
interpretation of this provision, which makes the health care 
                     
4 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944).  
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question an easy one, was settled in 1819 by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.5   
The central question in McCulloch was whether Congress had 
the power to charter the Bank of the United States, the 
precursor of today’s Federal Reserve.  The Constitution does not 
enumerate any power to create corporations.  The Bank’s 
opponents argued that the “necessary and proper” language 
permitted Congress only to choose means which were absolutely 
necessary to carry out those powers.  Marshall rejected this 
reading, which would make the government “incompetent to its 
great objects.”6  The federal government must collect and spend 
revenue throughout the United States, Marshall observed, and so 
must quickly transfer funds across hundreds of miles.  “Is that 
construction of the constitution to be preferred which would 
render these operations hazardous, difficult, and expensive?”7  
Without implied powers, Congress’s power “to establish post 
offices” could not entail the ability to punish those who rob 
the mail, and might not even entail the power to carry letters 
from one post office to another.  “It may be said with some 
plausibility that the right to carry the mail, and to punish 
                     
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 408. 
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those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the 
establishment of a post office and post road.”8   
The basic rule of McCulloch was reaffirmed by the Court as 
recently as May, 2010.  In deciding whether Congress is 
appropriately exercising its powers under the necessary and 
proper clause, the question is “whether the statute constitutes 
a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”9  The choice of means is left 
“’primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen 
that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, 
the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of 
the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be 
attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.’”10  
Thus, for example, even though the Constitution mentions no 
federal crimes other than counterfeiting, treason, and piracy, 
Congress has broad authority to enact criminal statutes.11 
 
II. The purported constitutional limitations 
 
A. The commerce power 
 
                     
8 Id. at 417. 
9 United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). 





Opponents of the mandate claim that, even if Congress can 
regulate health care, it can’t demand that you purchase private 
insurance.  “Congress has never before mandated that a citizen 
enter into an economic transaction with a private company,” 
writes Prof. Randy Barnett, “so there can be no judicial 
precedent for such a law.”12  But when Congress chartered the 
Bank of the United States, it had never done that before, 
either.  The underlying principle is not novel at all.  The 
Court declared it in McCulloch: a government which has the right 
to do an act – here, to regulate health care – “must, according 
to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means.”13   
The principal complaint about the mandate is that it is not 
a regulation of any activity.  Two prominent critics, David 
Rivkin and Lee Casey, object that it will “apply to every 
American simply because they exist.”14  But for reasons already 
explained, unless free riders are brought into the system, there 
is no way to insure everyone else.  The Eastern Virginia judge, 
Henry Hudson, declared that in order to be subject to regulation 
by Congress, an individual had to engage in “some type of self-
                     
12 Randy Barnett, Exceeding Congress’s Authority, New York Times Room For 
Debate, Mar. 28, 2010, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-
the-health-care-law-unconstitutional/. 
13 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 409-10. 
14 David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Health Care Purchase Mandate:  
Unconstitutional and Likely to Be Struck Down by the Courts, in A Healthy 
Debate at 99. 
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initiated action.”15  Roger Vinson, the Florida judge, similarly 
argued that failure to purchase health insurance is 
“inactivity,” and Congress cannot regulate inactivity.   
Vinson acknowledges that there is no authority for this 
distinction, but quotes United States v. Lopez16 for the 
proposition that unless the commerce power is somehow limited, 
it would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 
power.”17  If Congress can regulate inactivity, Vinson declared, 
it “could do almost anything it wanted,” and “we would have a 
Constitution in name only.”18  But there’s a big problem with 
citing Lopez:  it imposed limits on federal power, and the law 
it struck down (a ban on possessing handguns near schools) did 
not regulate inactivity.  Lopez itself shows that Congressional 
power can be limited without the activity/inactivity 
distinction.  The authority on which Vinson relies completely 
undermines the point he is trying to make. 
It is an interesting semantic question whether the decision 
to free ride on the health care system without paying for 
insurance is economic activity.  It is obviously an economic 
decision with economic consequences, but it still may not be 
economic activity, and a great deal of ink has been spilled on 
                     
15 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 
2010). 
16 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 





that question.19  It doesn’t matter.  Under the necessary and 
proper clause, it is enough that there is a national problem 
that only Congress can solve, and that “the means chosen are 
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end.”20 
 
B.  The necessary and proper clause 
 
The deepest flaw in the analyses by Judges Hudson and 
Vinson is their complete failure to grasp the fundamental 
McCulloch principle.  (I teach an introductory Constitutional 
Law class at Northwestern Law School.  We read McCulloch in the 
first week.)  Both supposed, nonsensically, that the commerce 
power is somehow a limit on Congress’s power to choose 
appropriate means.21  (Two other district judges, in Michigan and 
the Western District of Virginia, were more sensible, and 
summarily threw out the challenges.22)   
                     
19 See, e.g., David Kopel, The Obamacare mandate is unconstitutional, Daily 
Caller, Oct. 8, 2010, http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/08/the-obamacare-
mandate-is-unconstitutional/; Ilya Somin, Michigan District Court Upholds 
Individual Mandate Against Challenge by the Thomas More Law Center, Volokh 
Conspiracy, Oct. 7, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/10/07/michigan-district-
court-upholds-individual-mandate-against-challenge-by-the-thomas-more-law-
center/. 
20 United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010). 
21 Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 
2010)(refusing to dismiss challenge); Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Svcs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011)(invalidating law); Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010)(refusing to dismiss 
challenge); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. 
Va. 2010)(invalidating law). 
22 Thomas More Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Liberty 
Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
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“If a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at 
a particular time does not constitute the type of economic 
activity subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause,” Judge 
Hudson declared, “then logically, an attempt to enforce such 
provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally 
offensive to the Constitution.”23  By the same “logic,” if I 
can’t pick up a pencil with my brain, then it follows that I 
can’t do it with my hand either.  Try this reasoning in a few 
other constitutional contexts.  If locking up mail robbers is no 
part of the operation of a post office, then an attempt to do 
that under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive 
to the Constitution.  If growing marijuana for one’s own 
consumption is not regulable economic activity, then it too is 
immune from federal law. 
Judge Vinson’s analysis was even wilder.  He acknowledges, 
and even quotes, Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration in 
McCulloch that if “the end be legitimate,” then “all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end . . . are 
constitutional.”24  And then he admits that, under the settled 
meaning of the commerce power, which he does not question,25 
                     
23 The sentence appears in both Cuccinelli opinions: 728 F.Supp.2d at 779, 702 
F.Supp.2d at 611. 
24 Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 2011 WL at *61, quoting McCulloch 
at 421. 
25 He does suggest, as “an historical aside,” that insurance contracts are not 
part of commerce under what he takes to be the original understanding, but he 
does not pursue the point.  Id. at *23. 
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“regulating the health care insurance industry (including 
preventing insurers from excluding or charging higher rates to 
people with pre-existing conditions)” is a legitimate end.26  
But, three sentences later, he declares:  “The Necessary and 
Proper Clause cannot be utilized to ‘pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objects’ that are not within Congress’s 
enumerated powers.”27  Has he so quickly forgotten that he 
admitted that the object was within Congress’s enumerated 
powers? 
Judge Vinson notes that the government has “asserted again 
and again that the individual mandate is absolutely ‘necessary’ 
and ‘essential’ for the Act to operate as it was intended by 
Congress.  I accept that it is.”28  (Because the mandate was so 
necessary to the entire legislative scheme, he declared it 
nonseverable and invalidated the entire law.) In other words, 
even if McCulloch had come out the other way, the mandate would 
be authorized by the necessary and proper clause.  But the 
mandate is nonetheless unconstitutional, because it “falls 
outside the boundary of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and 
cannot be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated 
                     
26 Id. at *61-*62. 
27 Id. at *62. 
28 Id. at *63. 
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powers.”29  But this is flatly inconsistent with the authority 
that he just quoted. 
He suggests a more definite limitation on Congressional 
power:  the necessary and proper clause cannot be invoked if the 
problem Congress is trying to address is Congress’s own fault.  
Here is the argument: 
[R]ather than being used to implement or facilitate 
enforcement of the Act's insurance industry reforms, the 
individual mandate is actually being used as the means to 
avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself. Such an 
application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would have 
the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-
conceived, or economically disruptive statutes, secure in 
the knowledge that the more dysfunctional the results of 
the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the 
statutory fix would be. Under such a rationale, the more 
harm the statute does, the more power Congress could assume 
for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause. This 
result would, of course, expand the Necessary and Proper 
Clause far beyond its original meaning.30 
If, however, Congress has no power to address negative 
consequences that follow from its own statutory scheme, then 
Marshall was wrong about mail robbery after all.  Mail robbery 
                     
29 Id. 
30 Id. at *60. 
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is an adverse consequence of Congress’s decision to establish a 
post office: had it not done that, all those valuable papers 
would not be gathered together in one place.  But, you’ll say, 
that’s crazy; of course Congress can decide that it’s worth 
having a post office, even if establishing one creates negative 
side-effects which then must be addressed.  But if, as Vinson 
admitted, Congress can also decide that people with preexisting 
conditions can be protected, then how can the cases be 
distinguished? 
 
C.  The taxing power 
 
 Even if you somehow suppose that the mandate exceeds the 
commerce power, it would be valid anyway as an exercise of the 
power to tax.  Congress has a general power to “collect Taxes” 
to provide for the “general Welfare of the United States.”  The 
taxing power is not limited to objects of interstate commerce.  
A tax, the Court held in 1950, does not become unconstitutional 
“because it touches on activities which Congress might not 
otherwise regulate.”31  A claim that the tax is a “direct tax” 
forbidden by Article I, section 9 is even wilder, since the 
mandate is neither a general tax on individuals nor a tax on 
                     
31 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). 
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real estate – the original targets of this obscure and now 
rarely invoked provision.32   
Judges Hudson and Vinson declared that the mandate is not a 
tax because some of the law’s sponsors sometimes claimed that it 
was not, and because the statute declared that it was based on 
the commerce power.  (It did not, however, expressly disclaim 
reliance on the taxing power.)33  This reasoning would create two 
remarkable new doctrines:  that federal courts have authority to 
police the public statements of politicians, and that Congress 
must expressly invoke all possible constitutional bases for 
legislation.34  It is, however, long settled doctrine that 
federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and that, as 
the Supreme Court said in 1948, “The question of the 
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on 
recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”35  Judge 
Vinson also suggested – I am not making this up – that whenever 
Congress does something it hasn’t done before, its action is 
                     
32 The frivolousness of these arguments is further documented in Jack M. 
Balkin’s contributions to A Healthy Debate:  The Constitutionality of an 
Individual Mandate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93 (2009), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf. 
33 Cuccinelli, 728 F.Supp.2d at 784-86; Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1130-1144. 
34 This criticism of Judge Vinson’s reasoning is made in Gillian Metzger & 
Trevor Morrison, Health Care Reform, the Tax Power, and the Presumption of 
Constitutionality, Balkinization blog, Oct. 19, 2010, available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/health-care-reform-tax-power-and.html. 
35 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). 
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presumptively unconstitutional.36  These new rules would, if 
consistently applied, randomly blow up large parts of the U.S. 
Code.  This is constitutional interpretation undertaken in the 
spirit of a saboteur in wartime. 
 
III. The broccoli revolution 
 
 Some of the law’s opponents understand perfectly well that 
the law is permissible under presently prevailing 
interpretations of the Constitution.  They know their claims are 
frivolous.  They don’t like the law that makes their claims 
frivolous.   
What they really want is, not to invoke settled law, but to 
trash it – to replace the constitutional law we now have with 
something radically different.37  They propose to limit federal 
powers with no regard for the purposes for which those powers 
are being used.   
                     
36 Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1164 n.21 and 
2011 WL at *39. 
37 This is clearest in the work of Randy Barnett, who wants to authorize the 
Court to dismantle large parts of the federal government, and has proposed a 
constitutional amendment abolishing the federal income tax.  See Randy E. 
Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:  The Presumption of Liberty (2004); 
Randy E. Barnett, The Case for a Federalism Amendment, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 
2009.  Another prominent opponent of the law is Richard Epstein, who thinks 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is unconstitutional.  See Richard Epstein, 
Forbidden Grounds:  The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (1995); 
Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why 





They claim originalist credentials,38 but these are bogus.  
The framers’ most important decision was to replace the weak 
Articles of Confederation with a central government strong 
enough to address common problems.  According to those who claim 
that the law is unconstitutional, however, the problem of 
preexisting conditions can’t be solved at all.  A regime in 
which huge national problems can’t be solved by anyone is 
precisely what the framers were trying to get rid of. 
 If the limitations they demand are not accepted, Rivkin and 
Casey warn, Congress will have the power to do absolutely 
anything it likes, and “the whole concept of the federal 
government being a government of limited and enumerated powers 
goes out the window.”39  Judge Vinson worried that “Congress 
could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular 
intervals.”40 
The Broccoli Objection, as I will call it, rests on a 
simple mistake:  treating a slippery slope argument as a logical 
one, when in fact it is an empirical one.   
Frederick Schauer showed over 25 years ago that any 
slippery slope argument depends on a prediction that doing the 
                     
38 These are particularly on display in Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Svcs., 2011 WL at *2-3, 20-27. 
39 Rivkin and Casey at 99. 
40 Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 2011 WL at *46.  Judge Hudson 
expressed a similar worry during argument, though his concern was asparagus.  




right thing in the instant case will in fact increase the 
likelihood of doing the wrong thing in the danger case.41  If 
there is in fact no danger, then the fact that there logically 
could be has no weight.  For instance, the federal taxing power 
theoretically empowers the government to tax incomes at 100%, 
thereby wrecking the economy.  But there’s no slippery slope, 
because there is no incentive to do this, so it won’t happen. 
 Similarly with the Broccoli Objection.  The fear rests on 
one real problem:  there are lots of private producers, 
including many in agriculture, who want to use the coercive 
power of the federal government to transfer funds from your 
pockets into theirs.  But the last thing they want to do is 
impose duties on individuals, because then the individuals will 
know that they’ve been burdened.  There are too many other ways 
to get special favors in a less visible way. 
 So Congress is never going to force you to eat your 
broccoli.  On the other hand, you’re probably already consuming 
more high-fructose corn syrup than is good for you.  Subsidies 
for the production of corn have produced huge surpluses of the 
syrup, which in turn becomes a very cheap ingredient of mass-
produced food, and turns up in a remarkable amount of what you 
eat.  So consumers have to face obesity, diabetes, and dental 
caries – but no mandate!  You and I are paying for this 
                     
41 Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1985). 
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travesty, but in such a low-visibility way that many of us never 
realize that Dracula has been paying regular visits.  The 
Broccoli Objection distracts attention from the real problem.  
And the judiciary hasn’t got the tools to deal with that 
problem.  If the Supreme Court is going to invent new limits on 
the legislature, it should do so in a way that has a real chance 
of preventing actual abuses.  Otherwise it is hamstringing the 
legislature for no good reason.   
 
IV.  The real constitutional limits 
 
My Northwestern Law colleague Steven Lubet has offered an 
elegant summary of the constitutional claim against the federal 
health insurance mandate:  “The scholarly argument against the 
mandate pretty much runs this way:  (1) There must be some limit 
on federal power; (2) I can’t think of another one; and 
therefore, (3) the limit must preclude the individual mandate.”42 
                     
42 Email from Prof. Steven Lubet, Dec. 14, 2010.  For a prominent argument 
that comes close to saying exactly this, see Jason Mazzone, Can Congress 
Force You to be Healthy?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010.  It’s actually very easy 
to think of other ones.  There’s the one rejected in McCulloch:  Congress can 
only choose means that are absolutely necessary to the permitted end.  Or 
here are a few others:  Congress cannot enact any legislation that requires 
the use of instrumentalities that begin with the letter J.  Congress cannot 
enact any legislation that calls for enforcement on Tuesdays.  Congress 
cannot choose any means that weighs more than 346 pounds.  All of these would 
drive back the specter of unlimited Congressional power.  The only problem 
with them is that they are silly and have nothing to do with the underlying 
reasons for wanting to have limited but effective federal power in the first 
place.  The activity/inactivity distinction has the same problem. 
 More sensible limits, if one must devise some, are discussed in the 
text immediately following. 
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It’s not at all clear that it’s important to have 
judicially imposed limits on Congressional power.  There were 
practically no such limits between the 1930s and the 1990s, yet 
the federal government did not take over all state functions: 
tort law, contract law, criminal law, and education remained 
dominated by state law.43  Lopez imposed a new restriction, 
though its contours remain uncertain.  If you think a line has 
to be drawn, however, you should focus on the one that the 
framers of the Constitution actually drew – a line that has 
nothing to do with the activity/inactivity distinction. 
At Philadelphia in 1787, the Convention resolved that 
Congress could “legislate in all cases to which the separate 
States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United 
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation.”44  This was then translated by the Committee of 
Detail into the present enumeration of powers in Article I, 
which was accepted as a functional equivalent by the Convention 
without much discussion.45  It includes the commerce and 
“necessary and proper” provisions. 
                     
43 Andrew Koppelman, How ‘Decentralization’ Rationalizes Oligarchy:  John 
McGinnis and the Rehnquist Court,  20 Const. Comm. 11, 20 (2003). 
44 Quoted in Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:  Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution 177 (1996). 
45 “Though it has been argued that this action marked a crucial, even 
subversive shift in the deliberations, the fact that it went unchallenged 
suggests that the committee was only complying with the general expectations 
of the Convention.”  Id. at 178. 
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Did the Committee of Detail botch its job, limiting 
Congressional power more than the Convention intended, and 
creating a regime in which Congress could not legislate in cases 
the separate states were incompetent to address?  Did the 
Convention not notice the massive change?  No.  This language 
was accepted without objection for good reasons.  In an 
important recent study, Jack Balkin shows that the word 
“commerce” at the time of the framing referred to all 
interaction between people, and so “the commerce power 
authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activities that 
produce spillover effects between states or generate collective 
action problems that concern more than one state.”46  If health 
care markets involve such effects or problems, then the mandate 
presents, once more, a very easy case.  This is not a recipe for 
unlimited power:  grandstanding statutes that horn in on matters 
that are purely local, such as the federal ban on possession of 
handguns near schools that the Supreme Court struck down in 
Lopez, exceeds the commerce power.  But the national health care 
insurance market is not a purely local matter. 
One thing that the framers did not anticipate was the 
spectacular advances of the past 200 years in our capacity to 
                     
46 Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2010).  Once upon a time, 
more sober Republicans advocated a similar understanding of the commerce 
power.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and 




treat disease, prolong life, and ameliorate congenital illness.  
Many of these innovations are expensive.  So with modern 
medicine comes a new kind of moral horror:  the patient with a 
treatable disease who cannot afford to pay for the treatment. 
The reform of the American health care system to ensure 
that no one would be uninsurable or bankrupted by illness was 
too big a task for the states to address individually.  Any 
state that mandates insurance for pre-existing conditions will 
attract sick people and drive away healthy ones.  That is why 
only Massachusetts has managed to do it.  (Seven other states 
tried to protect people with pre-existing conditions without 
mandating coverage for everyone.  The results ranged from huge 
premium increases to the complete collapse of the market.47)  The 
collective action problems mean that most states cannot reform 
health insurance even if they all would prefer to.  It is a 
matter in which the states were separately incompetent.  It is 
precisely the kind of problem that the framers intended the 
Federal government to be able to address. 
 
V.  Radical libertarianism 
 
                     
47 See Brief Amici Curiae of March of Dimes Foundation et al, Virginia ex rel. 





If the bill’s critics are right, we have an obligation to 
replace the well-functioning constitutional system we have 
inherited with one that is radically defective.  It is 
mysterious why any sane person would want to do that.  Marshall 
was right.  A construction which denied Congress the power to 
choose the most sensible method for carrying out its lawful 
purposes would be “so pernicious in its operation that we shall 
be compelled to discard it.”48   
What really drives the constitutional claims against the 
bill is not arguments about the Commerce Clause or the taxing 
power, but an implicit libertarianism that focuses on the burden 
a law imposes on individuals and pays no attention at all to 
legitimate state interests.49  A Heritage Foundation paper warns:  
“Mandating that all private citizens enter into a contract with 
a private company to purchase a good or service, or be punished 
by a fine labeled a ‘tax,’ is unprecedented in American 
history.”50  (Never mind that this would also invalidate George 
W. Bush’s proposed privatization of Social Security, which many 
Republicans continue to enthusiastically support.)  The Florida 
Attorney General frankly argued for a substantive constitutional 
                     
48 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 416. 
49 The limits of libertarianism are further explored in Andrew Koppelman with 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, A Right to Discriminate? How the Case of Boy Scouts 
of America v. James Dale Warped the Law of Free Association (2009). 
50 Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal 
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, 





right “to make personal healthcare decisions without 
governmental interference.”51  Near the end of his opinion, 
almost as an afterthought, Judge Hudson writes: “At its core, 
this dispute is not simply about regulating the business of 
insurance – or crafting a system of universal health insurance 
coverage – it’s about an individual’s right to choose to 
participate.”52 
The Supreme Court rejected the purported “inherent right of 
every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as 
to him seems best” in 1905, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.53  The 
claimant there asserted that mandatory smallpox vaccination 
violated his rights.  It is true that vaccination is an 
imposition on one’s liberty.  Dying of smallpox is also an 
imposition on one’s liberty. 
Jacobson was decided the same year as the infamous Lochner 
v. New York,54 in which the Court invented a right of employers 
to be free from maximum hours laws.  The right that Republicans 
are now asserting was too much even for the Lochner Court.  Was 
Jacobson wrong?  Does the Constitution protect the smallpox 
virus? 
                     
51 Fla. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1162, quoting 
plaintiff’s argument. 
52 Cuccinelli, 728 F.Supp.2d at 788. 
53 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
54 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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This implicit libertarianism is pervasive in the arguments 
against the law, but it is intellectually incoherent, because it 
is intended to apply only against the federal government, not 
the states.55  It has not been explained where this individual 
right is supposed to come from – it happens not to be mentioned 
in the text of the Constitution – or why it doesn’t also 
invalidate anything that the states try to do to force people 




What will the Supreme Court do?  There is no nice way to 
say this:  the silliness of the constitutional objections may 
not be enough to stop these judges from relying on them to 
strike down the law.  The Republican party, increasingly, is the 
party of urban legends:  that tax cuts for the rich always pay 
for themselves, that government spending doesn’t create jobs, 
that government overregulation of banks caused the crash of 
2008, that global warming is not happening.  The 
unconstitutionality of health care reform is another of those 
legends, legitimated in American culture by frequent repetition.   
                     
55 The Supreme Court recently made clear that if there were a rights-based 
objection to a federal statute, that would imply that a state would likewise 
be prohibited from enacting that statute.  Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956. 
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If the Constitution were as defective as the bill’s 
opponents claim it is, a regime in which national problems must 
remain permanently unsolved, why would it deserve our 
allegiance?  The only sane thing to do would be to try to get 
free of it – to try, by amendment or judicial construction, to 
nullify its limits so that we can live in a humanly habitable 
world.  To continue to live with such a perverse constitution 
would be mindless ancestor worship. 
But the opponents of reform have been unfair to the 
framers.  Chief Justice Marshall was right when he said that the 
Constitution does not “attempt to provide, by immutable rules, 
for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen 
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”56  
Instead, it provides a structure for us to govern ourselves.  
That is precisely what Congress did when, at long last, it took 
on the spectacularly broken American system of health care 
delivery. 
                     
56 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415. 
